Where database blog posts get flame-broiled to perfection
Alright, let's take a look at this... he squints at the screen, a low, humorless chuckle escaping his lips.
Oh, this is precious. A blog post on how to use your disaster recovery pipeline as a self-serve dev environment vending machine. Truly a revolutionary synergy. Itâs like using your fire extinguisher to water your plantsâwhat could possibly go wrong? Youâre not just setting up a standby cluster; youâre setting up a future headline.
Let's start with the heart of this Rube Goldberg data-spillage machine: pgBackRest. A wonderful tool, Iâm sure. And Iâm also sure youâve configured its access with the same meticulous care a toddler gives to their sandcastle. Let me guess the authentication method: a single, all-powerful, passwordless SSH key sitting in the home directory of a generic jenkins user? A "God Key" that not only has root on the primary database but also write access to the S3 bucket where you lovingly store your unencrypted, PII-laden backups. You haven't just created a backup system; you've created a one-stop-shop for any attacker looking to exfiltrate your entire company's data in a single .tar.gz. Convenience is key, after all.
And then we have the streaming replication. A constant, open firehose of your most sensitive production data piped directly over the network. I'm sure you've secured that channel. You've got TLS with certificate pinning and rotating CAs, right? He leans in closer to the imaginary author. No, of course you don't. You have a pg_hba.conf entry that says host all all 0.0.0.0/0 trust. You're essentially shouting every single transaction into the void and just hoping only the standby is listening. Every INSERT into your users table, every UPDATE on a credit card transactionâall flying across your "secure" internal network in the clear. Whatâs the blast radius of a compromised standby server? Oh, thatâs right: everything.
But the real stroke of genius, the part that will have forensics teams weeping for years, is this concept of spinning up a "separate standalone cluster as needed."
...to set up ... a separate standalone cluster as needed.
"As needed" by whom? A developer who needs to test a feature? An intern who wants to "poke around"? You are taking a point-in-time snapshot of your entire production databaseâcustomer data, financial records, trade secrets, all of itâand cloning it into an unmanaged, unmonitored, unaudited environment.
Let me just list the ways this fails literally every compliance framework known to man:
You can forget about passing a SOC 2 audit. The auditor will take one look at this architecture, slowly close their laptop, and walk out of the building without a word. Your change control process is a Post-it note, your access management is a free-for-all, and your data lifecycle policy is "keep it forever, everywhere."
Every feature here is a CVE waiting to be assigned. The backup repository is a pre-packaged data breach. The replication slot is a persistent backdoor. The "standalone cluster" is evidence for the prosecution. This isnât a guide to high availability; itâs a speedrun to bankruptcy.
So please, continue. Leverage these "capabilities." Iâll be waiting for the inevitable "Lessons Learned" post-mortem blog post in six months, right after we all read about your breach on the front page of KrebsOnSecurity. And Iâll be the first one in the comments section, typing a single, solitary "I told you so."
Marcus "Zero Trust" Williams Principal Catastrophe Analyst