Where database blog posts get flame-broiled to perfection
Alright, let's pull up a chair and review this... masterpiece of performance analysis. I've seen more robust security planning in a public S3 bucket. While you're busy counting query-per-second deltas that are statistically indistinguishable from a stiff breeze, let's talk about the gaping holes you've benchmarked into existence.
First off, you "compiled Postgres from source." Of course you did. Because who needs stable, vendor-supported packages with security patches and a verifiable supply chain? You've created an artisanal, unauditable binary on a fresh-out-of-the-oven Ubuntu release. I have no idea what compiler flags you used, if you enabled basic exploit mitigations like PIE or FORTIFY_SOURCE, or if you accidentally pulled in a backdoored dependency from some sketchy repo. This isn't a build; it's Patient Zero for a novel malware strain. Your make command is the beginning of our next incident report.
You're running this on a "SuperMicro SuperWorkstation." Cute. A glorified desktop. Let me guess, the IPMI is wide open with the default ADMIN/ADMIN credentials, the BIOS hasn't been updated since it left the factory, and you've disabled all CPU vulnerability mitigations in the kernel for that extra 1% QPS. This entire setup is a sterile lab environment that has zero resemblance to a production system. You haven't benchmarked Postgres; you've benchmarked how fast a database can run when you ignore every single security control required to pass even a cursory audit. Good luck explaining this to the SOC 2 auditor when they ask about your physical and environmental controls.
Let's talk about your configuration. You're testing with io_method=io_uring. Ah yes, the kernel's favorite attack surface. You're chasing microscopic performance gains by using an I/O interface that has been a veritable parade of high-severity local privilege escalation CVEs. While you're celebrating a 1% throughput improvement on random-points, an attacker is celebrating a 100% success rate at getting root on your host. This isn't a feature; it's a bug bounty speedrun waiting to happen. You're essentially benchmarking how quickly you can get owned.
This whole exercise is based on sysbench running with 16 clients in a tight loop. Your benchmark simulates a world with no network latency, no TLS overhead, no authentication handshakes, no complex application logic, no row-level security, and certainly no audit logging. You're measuring a fantasy. In the real world, where we have to do inconvenient things like encrypt traffic and log user activity, your precious 3% regression will be lost in the noise. Your benchmark is the equivalent of testing a car's top speed by dropping it out of a plane—the numbers are impressive, but utterly irrelevant to its actual function.
And the grand takeaway? A 1-3% performance difference that you admit "will take more time to gain confidence in." You've introduced a mountain of operational risk, created a bespoke binary of questionable origin, and stress-tested a known kernel vulnerability vector... all to prove next to nothing. The amount of attack surface you've embraced for a performance gain that a user would never notice is, frankly, astounding. It's the most elaborate and pointless self-sabotage I've seen all quarter.
This isn't a performance report; it's a pre-mortem. I give it six months before the forensics team is picking through the smoldering ruins of this "SuperWorkstation" trying to figure out how every single row of data ended up on the dark web. But hey, at least you'll have some really detailed charts for the breach notification letter.